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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to address some crit-
icisms recently raised by John Horty in two ar-
ticles against the validity of two commonly ac-
cepted defeasible reasoning patterns, viz. rein-
statement and floating conclusions. I shall argue
that Horty’s counterexamples, although they sig-
nificantly raise our understanding of these rea-
soning patterns, do not show their invalidity.
Some of them reflect patterns which, if made ex-
plicit in the formalisation, avoid the unwanted
inference without having to give up the criti-
cised inference principles. Other examples seem
to involve hidden assumptions about the specific
problem which, if made explicit, are nothing but
extra information that defeat the defeasible infer-
ence. These considerations will be put in a wider
perspective by reflecting on the nature of defeasi-
ble reasoning principles as principles of justified
acceptance rather than ‘real’ logical inference.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to address some criticisms re-
cently raised by John Horty in two articles (Horty; 2001,
2002) against the validity of some commonly accepted de-
feasible reasoning patterns. Horty criticises two such pat-
terns, viz. reinstatement and floating conclusions. In addi-
tion, he criticises a group of inferences where the failure to
interleave argument construction and argument evaluation
would lead to problems. For each of these cases, Horty
presents a series of examples in which his intuitions are
that it is coherent for a reasoner to accept the premises but
not the conclusion.
Horty’s examples are intriguing and his discussion of them
is very insightful. Yet I disagree with the conclusions he
draws from them. I shall argue that his examples do not
demonstrate the invalidity of the reasoning patterns. Some
of them reflect patterns which, if made explicit in the for-
malisation, avoid the unwanted inference without having
to give up the inference principles criticised by Horty. In
the remaining examples Horty’s intuitions seem to be based
on hidden assumptions about the specific problem which,
if made explicit, are nothing but extra information under
which the inference cannot be drawn; in other words, these
examples do not show that the reasoning patterns are in-
valid but just that they are defeasible. I shall then put these
considerations in a wider perspective, reflecting on the na-
ture of defeasible reasoning principles as principles of jus-
tified acceptance rather than ‘real’ logical inference.
The discussion in this paper will be informal and concep-
tual rather than technical, and will freely switch from one
style of nonmonotonic logic to another whenever appropri-
ate (although with some bias to argumentation approaches).
I assume that the reader is familiar with the essentials of
the main approaches to nonmonotonic logic, especially de-
fault logic, preferential entailment and argumentation sys-
tems (particularly in the style of Pollock (1995) and Dung
(1995)). Formal treatments of most examples of this paper
can be found in the two papers by Horty and in (Prakken
and Vreeswijk; 2002).
First I will say more on the role of intuitions in the devel-
opment of logic in general and of nonmonotonic logic in
particular.
2 Intuitions in logic
In both his articles Horty mainly relies on intuitions in con-
crete examples. In fact, he explicitly says that this is “the
only method that I know of in this area, where there is no
recourse to anything like a formal semantics: (. . . )” (Horty;
2001, p. 9). In fact, in the field of nonmonotonic logic this
approach has been very popular; see e.g. Lifschitz (1988)’s
well-known list of benchmark examples. Setting aside the
issue whether a formal semantics of defeasible reasoning
is indeed impossible, I will argue that in this area relying
on intuitions is extremely prone to error, and that there are
better, more principled approaches.
The use of intuitions in evaluating logical systems has been
criticed before; see e.g. Veltman (1985). For one thing,
the question arises whose intuitions should count. Those
of logicians are hopelessly corrupted by overexposure to
formalism. So should we ask the ‘average language user’,
hoping that they are not infected by theoretical bias? Then
the problem often arises that their answers reveal a lacking
understanding of the reasoning patterns; however, teaching
them about these reasoning patterns infects them with the
theoretical bias we were hoping to avoid. Another obvious
problem is that intuitions of different persons often conflict.
For these and other reasons a sensible way to use intuitions
seems, each time they present us with a puzzle, not to di-
rectly rely on them, but to see whether they reflect some
underlying pattern. This is the strategy I will follow in the
present paper.
3 Reinstatement
The first reasoning pattern discussed by Horty (2001) is re-
instatement. This pattern, endorsed by most nonmonotonic
logics, can be naturally explained in terms of argumenta-
tion systems.
Let me first fix some terminology on argumentation sys-
tems that I will use throughout the paper, sometimes ap-
plied to other nonmonotonic logis as well (such application
is possible since, as shown by e.g. Dung (1995) and Bon-
darenko et al. (1997), many nonmonotonic logics can be
reformulated as argumentation systems). Defeat is a binary
relation between arguments: that argument
 
defeats argu-
ment  means that
 
and  are in conflict with each other
and  is not preferred over
 
. I say that
 
strictly defeats
 if
 
defeats  and not vice versa.
Justification is a skeptical notion of nonmonotonic conse-
quence. Argumentation systems usually classify argments
into three classes, justified, defensible and overruled ar-
guments. Loosely speaking, the justified arguments are
those with which a dispute can be ‘won’, the overruled ar-
guments are those with which a dispute should be ‘lost’,
and the defensible arguments should leave the dispute un-
decided. Conclusions of justified arguments are skeptical
consequences and those of defensible arguments are credu-
lous consequences of a theory. Horty only discusses skep-
tical consequence, i.e., justification.
Now reinstatement is the phenomenon that an argument
that is (perhaps strictly) defeated by another argument is
still justified since it its defeater is itself strictly defeated
by another justified argument; cf. Figure 1.
 
 
Figure 1: Argument  reinstates argument
 
.
Reinstatement is embodied in all Dung-style argumenta-
tion systems via a notion of acceptability: an argument
 
is acceptable with respect to a set  of arguments if all ar-
guments defeating
 
are defeated by an argument in  . For
instance, in Figure 1 the argument
 
is acceptable with re-
spect to the set 
 	

 .
Reinstatement has a direct and an indirect form, and Horty
only rejects its direct form. Direct reinstatement is when all
three arguments are in conflict on their final conclusions, as
in the following example (where the more specific default
is preferred over the less specific one).
Example 3.1
 
: Tweety flies because it is a bird
 : Tweety does not fly because it is a penguin
 : Tweety flies because it is a magic penguin
Indirect reinstatement, on the other hand, is when the re-
instating argument  defeats the ‘middle’ argument  on
one of its intermediary conclusions, such as in the follow-
ing example.
Example 3.2
 
: Tweety flies because it is a bird
 : Tweety is a penguin because it was observed to
be so, so Tweety does not fly
 : The observation that Tweety is a penguin is
unreliable since it was done during a blizzard
Figure 2 depicts indirect reinstatement (as for notation, for
any pair of arguments  and  , the latter is a proper
subargument of the first.)
 




Figure 2: Indirect reinstatement
3.1 Is direct reinstatement invalid?
Horty (2001) argues that Example 3.1 shows that direct re-
instatement is invalid, since the reason that Tweety flies is
that it is a magic penguin and not that it is a bird. (He does
so in a critical discussion of (Prakken and Sartor; 1997), a
system of prioritised extended logic programming that in-
stantiates Dung (1995)’s grounded semantics.)
Before Horty reaches this conclusion, he first considers an
alternative strategy with such examples, viz. to simply live
with the anomaly that the first default is not defeated on the
grounds that after all the correct conclusion is drawn that
Tweety can fly. He rejects this strategy with an example
in which the consequent of the least preferred default is
logically stronger than that of the most preferred default.
Example 3.3
 
: Microsoft employees tend to be millionaire
 
: New Microsoft employees tend to have less than
half a million
 
: New Microsoft employees in department  have
at least half a million.
Suppose again that the more specific default is preferred
over the less specific one. According to Horty, in this case
an argument for new Microsoft employees in department
 based on the least specific default
 
leads to the incor-
rect conclusion that they are millionaires. Horty therefore
concludes that direct reinstatement must be rejected as a
principle of defeasible reasoning.
How convincing is Horty’s argument? I agree with him that
in Examples 3.1 and 3.3 the least specific default should not
be applied, so Horty is right when he says that reinstate-
ment cannot be combined with the simple representation
method of Example 3.3. In this sense I agree with his crit-
icism on my earlier work in (Prakken and Sartor; 1997).
However, I think that these observations do not imply in-
validity of direct reinstatement, since there is an alternative
approach which respects Horty’s observations in the exam-
ples but validates reinstatement, and which can make rele-
vant distinctions between kinds of examples that go unno-
ticed in the simple representation scheme of Example 3.3.
The alternative approach is to make the language expres-
sive enough to let applicable defaults block the applicabil-
ity of other defaults when needed. One way to implement
this approach is well-known technique of exception or ab-
normality clauses (note that the logic of (Prakken and Sar-
tor; 1997) supports this technique, although in most of our
examples we did not use it). For instance, in preferential
entailment with minimisation of the
 
predicate, all pre-
ferred models of the following theory plus the fact that Jeff
is a new Microsoft employee of department  satisfy that
Jeff owns at least half a million dollars, but not all such
models satisfy that he is a millionaire.
	

: Microsoft employee 
    
	

: New Microsoft Employee  Microsoft employee
	

: New Microsoft employee 
    
	ff : New Microsoft employee    
	flfi : New MicrosoftX Employee  New Microsoft
employee
	flffi : New MicrosoftX employee 
   ffi   !"
	fl# : New MicrosoftX employee   $ 
In argumentation terms, the argument for
 

is not af-
fected by the argument for
 $

: a new Microsoft employee
is still an abnormal Microsoft employee, but he may also
be an abnormal new Microsoft employee.
The reason that this approach seems better than simply
invalidating reinstatement is that whether reinstatement
should go through or not seems to depend on the nature of
the domain, the kind of knowledge involved and the context
in which this knowledge is used. Consider the following
moral example on reasons for the severity of punishment.
Example 3.4
	

: For theft imprisonment upto 6 years is acceptable
	

: For theft out of poverty imprisonment of more
than 3 years is not acceptable
	

: For theft during riots only imprisonment of more
than 4 years is acceptable
And suppose that 	

is preferred to 	

which is in turn pre-
ferred to 	

. As in the Microsoft example, the consequent
of the most preferred default is logically weaker than the
consequent of the least preferred default. Yet it seems that
for theft during riots out of poverty any imprisonment must
be between 4 and 6 years. A general reason for this out-
come could be that reasons for the severity of punishment
do not block but just outweigh each other.
Or consider the following legal evidence example.
Example 3.5 Consider the following three witness state-
ments.
%

: John says that the suspect stabbed the victim
%

: Bob says that the suspect did not kill the victim
%

: Al says that the suspect killed the victim
And suppose that for whatever reason Bob is regarded as
more credible than John and Al as more credible than Bob
(suppose, for instance, that Al is always right). Here it
seems quite reasonable to accept the least credible source
since the only defeating source is overruled.
The point of these examples is that in modelling default rea-
soning one needs the extra expressiveness in order to con-
trol the blocking of defaults. Of course, one should avoid
tinkering with the formalisation in concrete examples just
to get a desired outcome. Therefore, the challenge for re-
search is to find general principles for choosing the right
formalisation. For two examples of research in this spirit
see Pollock’s research on undercutting defeaters in epis-
temic contexts, e.g. Pollock (1995), and Hage and Verheij’s
work on defeasible reasoning with legal rules and princi-
ples, e.g. Verheij et al. (1998). This work indicates that
such principles depend on the domain, the kind of knowl-
edge involved and the context in which it is used. For in-
stance, in statistical reasoning with empirical regularities
blocking more general defaults by more specific defaults
can be justified by the total evidence requirement of statis-
tical reasoning. Now a crucial difference between the three
examples of this section is that only Example 3.3 involves
reasoning of the latter kind; Example 3.4 involves moral
reasoning, while Example 3.5 involves reasoning about the
credibility of information sources.
Concluding this section, I agree with Horty that direct re-
instatement does not go together with the simple represen-
tation scheme of Example 3.3 (used by Horty (1994) in his
inheritance systems and by me and Giovanni Sartor in most
of (Prakken and Sartor; 1997)). However, I have argued
that the problems are not due to direct reinstatement but to
the weak expressiveness of the representation. This conclu-
sion can be strengthened if further defeasible reasoning pat-
terns can be found where more expressiveness of the above
kind is needed. And below I will argue that such further
reasoning patterns indeed exist.
3.2 Should argument construction and argument
evaluation be interleaved?
Horty (2001) discusses a further set of examples which ac-
cording to him reveals another flaw of Dung-style systems,
viz. that they don’t interleave the construction and evalua-
tion of arguments. However, I will argue that these exam-
ples are better treated as attacks on reinstatement.
Example 3.6 Consider four arguments
  


 and  
such that  strictly defeats
 
,
 
strictly defeats  ,
 
and
  defeat each other and  and  defeat each other.
 
 
 
Horty discusses the following instantiation, again with
subclass-superclass defeat.
 
: Larry is rich because he is a public defender,
public defenders are lawyers, and lawyers are rich
 : Larry is not rich because he is a public defender,
and public defenders are not rich
 : Larry is rich because he lives in Brentwood,
and people who live in Brentwood are rich
 
: Larry is not rich because he rents in Brentwood,
and people who rent in Brentwood are not rich
Since none of these arguments is undefeated, in none of the
Dung-style systems it skeptically follows that Larry is poor.
The same holds for prioritised default logics (e.g. Brewka
(1994)). Yet it might be argued that since both arguments
that Larry is rich are strictly defeated by an argument that
Larry is not rich, it should skeptically follow that Larry is
not rich. This is the outcome obtained by Horty (1994).
Horty’s diagnosis is that the problems are caused by mis-
takenly separating the phases of argument construction and
argument evaluation. According to him, Dung-style sys-
tems reflect a picture of defeasible reasoning in which first
all possible arguments are constructed, all relevant defeat
relations are identified, and then the justified arguments
are determined on the basis of this overall pattern of de-
feat. Horty prefers an approach in which “arguments are
constructed step-by-step and are evaluated in each step of
their construction: those that are indefensible (. . . ) are dis-
carded at once, and so cannot influence the status of oth-
ers.” (Horty; 2001, p. 11). Applied to the example, in this
approach the arguments
 
and  are discarded as soon as
their defeat by  , respectively,
 
is noted, so that they can-
not interfere with
 
, respectively,  .
To comment on this, note first that the interleaving ap-
proach is consistent with the validity of direct reinstate-
ment. Suppose a reasoner, when confronted with the ar-
guments
 
and  , aks whether
 
is now “clearly indefen-
sible”. The answer is “yes” only if the fact that  is in
turn defeated by  is regarded irrelevant for the status of
 
, so only if reinstatement is rejected; but the interleaving
approach does not force this answer. So, Horty’s examples
seem more convincing as examples against reinstatement
than against ‘non-interleaving’.
Now does the example reveal a flaw with direct reinstate-
ment? The same alternative approach as above prevents a
clear positive answer:
	

: Lawyer 

 


Rich
	

: Public defender  Lawyer
	

: Public defender 
      Rich
	ff : Public defender   $ 
	flfi : Brentwood resident 

 $
fi

Rich
	flffi : Brentwood tenant

Brentwood resident
	fl# : Brentwood tenant 

 $
#

 Rich
	 : Brentwood tenant

 $
fi
The point is that 	fl and 	  give rise to two additional ar-
guments
 
and  , undercutting, respectively,
 
and  ,
so that  and   are justified. Again the undercutters are
based on the general principle that statistical information
about subclasses overrides conflicting statistical informa-
tion about superclasses.
3.3 Conclusion on reinstatement
What conclusions can be drawn fom the discussion so far?
I have said that there are good reasons not to reject direct re-
instatement but instead to adopt a logic of sufficient expres-
siveness in which reinstatement is valid but can be avoided.
With the latter I mean that the logic should offer the means
to formalise, when desirable, reinstatement-like examples
in a way that does not formally reflect the reinstatement
pattern. This approach should be combined with an inves-
tigation of general principles for choosing the proper for-
malisation.
4 Floating conclusions
I now turn to Horty (2002)’s criticism of another defeasible
reasoning pattern. Sometimes one is faced with two con-
flicting and equally strong arguments, but whatever way the
conflict would be resolved, a certain conclusion could al-
ways be reached. Such conclusions were by Makinson and
Schlechta (1991) called ‘floating conclusions’. When mod-
elling skeptical reasoning, the question is whether floating
conclusions should come out as justified.
Floating conclusions can only be modelled as justified if
the logic gives rise to alternative conclusion sets in case of
an irresolvable conflict (such as default logic or Dung’s pre-
ferred and stable argumentation semantics). In such logics
the justified conclusions can be defined as those contained
in all such sets. If a logic always induces a unique con-
clusion set (such as Dung (1995)’s grounded semantics and
Horty (1994)’s inheritance system), then floating conclu-
sions cannot be recognised as justified. This is generally
regarded as a drawback of such systems.
Let us consider an example.
Example 4.1 (Floating conclusions.) Consider the argu-
ments
 
 ,
 
,   and  such that
 
 and   defeat each
other and
 
and  have the same conclusion.
 




 
An intuitive reading (entirely based on reality) is
 
 : Brygt Rykkje is Dutch since he was born
in Holland
  : Brygt Rykkje is Norwegian since he has
a Norwegian name
 
: Brygt Rykkje likes ice skating since he
is Dutch
 : Brygt Rykkje likes ice skating since he
is Norwegian
Whichever way the conflict between
 
 and   is de-
cided, we always end up with an argument for the conclu-
sion that Brygt Rykkje likes ice skating, so it seems that
this conclusion is justified, even though it is not supported
by a justified argument. In other words, the status of this
conclusion floats on the status of the arguments
 
 and
  .
It is easy to see that Horty’s ‘interleaving’ approach to de-
feasible reasoning fails to draw this floating conclusion,
since it cuts off both arguments after
 
 and   . How-
ever, it is important to note that rejecting floating conclu-
sions does not imply a rejection of direct reinstatement.
There are natural systems (such as grounded semantics for
Dung’s argumentation systems) that validate reinstatement
but that do not validate floating conclusions.
4.1 Horty examples (1): counterexamples or
additional information?
In the above example, there seems nothing wrong with ac-
cepting the floating conclusion as justified. However, Horty
(2002) presents an intriguing set of other instantiations, in
all of which the situation is less clear. Horty therefore con-
cludes that it is at least coherent for a skeptical reasoner
not to accept floating conclusions, so that such conclusions
cannot be accepted as a matter of logic.
Horty’s main example is a rather dramatic one, in which a
person (call him Bob) must quickly decide about a certain
investment, and whose parents are both terminally ill. Bob
knows that both his parents are rich, but he does not know
whether they will let him inherit a large sum of money. His
sister tells him that she has spoken to both her parents, and
that father will not let him inherit anything but mother will
let him inherit enough to make his investment. His brother
tells him the reverse, viz. that he has also spoken to both his
parents, and that not his mother but his father will let him
inherit enough to make his investment. Horty argues that in
this example it is reasonable to withhold any judgement on
whether the investment is secure, since brother and sister’s
conflicting testimonies undermine each other’s credibility;
and why should it be more reasonable to believe one of
them than to believe neither?
The examples highlight a very interesting pattern, viz. the
pattern where the fact that sources of information con-
flict undermines the credibility of both sources. However,
I think that this specific example has some weaknesses,
which indicate the problematic nature of intuitions in con-
crete examples. The point is that it is very easy to read an
additional default principle into the example, viz. that peo-
ple tend to speak the truth about their intentions, and that
it is also very easy to mistake this additional information
for the intuition that the reasoning pattern is invalid. Note
that this additional default principle is undercut as soon as
it turns out that a person has told conflicting things about
his or intentions to different persons. Now if both the addi-
tional principle and its undercutter are made explicit, there
will also be conclusion sets where neither father nor mother
lets Bob inherit anything, so that the issue of floating con-
clusions does not arise.
The same analysis applies to several other of Horty
(2002)’s examples. For instance, Horty discusses an ex-
ample with two defaults saying that persons tend to live
where their spouse lives and that they tend to live where
they work. He applies this to a case where a person works
in X while his wife lives in Y, and he observes that the con-
clusion that the person lives in X or Y is less likely than
the conclusion that he lives somewhere in between X and
Y. Again I agree, but I think that Horty fails to make an-
other default explicit, viz. that couples who both work but
not in the same city, tend to live somewhere in between
where they work. If this default is added, the unwarranted
disjunctive conclusion is not justified any more.
The main lesson to be learned from these examples is that
in modelling defeasible reasoning it is very dangerous to
rely on intuitions in concrete examples. In fact, counter-
intuitions are much more problematic in defeasible than in
deductive reasoning. In the latter, any counterexample in-
validates an inference, precisely because the inferences are
meant to be deductive. But when extra information can in-
validate an inference, the boundary between being a coun-
terexample and being additional invalidating information
becomes vague.
However, there are also examples to which the above criti-
cism does not seem to apply with the same force.
4.2 Horty examples (2): mutually undermining
floating conclusions
Horty also discusses examples where it is less easy to point
at suppressed additional information. In one example, two
military spies report to their commander on their enemy:
one spy says that the enemy has retreated to the forest, the
other that the enemy has retreated to the mountains. Should
the commander believe that the enemy has retreated and
act accordingly? In this example I agree with Horty that
the fact that the two spy reports conflict undermines the
credibility of both, so that the commander is not justified in
believing that the enemy has retreated.
For a legal version of this example, consider the following
two witness testimonies.
Example 4.2
%

: John says that the suspect stabbed the victim
%

: Bob says that the suspect shot the victim
Clearly, the two witnesses undermine each other’s credibil-
ity, so in the absence of further information on their credi-
bility the conclusion that the suspect killed the victim is not
warranted.
However, again I disagree that these examples simply show
the invalidity of a reasoning pattern. In fact, the same
strategy works as when reinstatement seems undesirable:
whenever floating conclusions appear unacceptable, for-
malise the example in such a way that it does not instantiate
the pattern of floating conclusions.
Of course, this strategy makes sense only if the best for-
malisation can be chosen on the basis of general criteria.
Now in all of these examples the key issue is reliability
of a certain source of information or advice. So we should
look for general criteria for how the credibility of witnesses
or experts can be undercut. One natural principle is that
the fact that two witnesses or experts contradict each other
undercuts the credibility of both. In Pollock (1995)’s sys-
tem, which formalises the interaction between defeasible
reasons and their possible undercutters, this could be ex-
pressed as follows.
	

: If witness % says   , this is a prima facie reason for
believing  
	

: if witness % says  and   and  are incompatible,
this is a prima facie reason for believing  	

	

is a (defeasible) undercutter of 	  . It is easy to see that
in case of John and Bob 	

applies to both of them so 	

is
blocked for of them.
However, in Section 3 I argued that a third witness state-
ment might reinstate one of Bob or John’s testimony. Con-
sider again Example 3.5 and assume that for certain par-
ticular reasons Al’s statement is judged more credible than
Bob’s:
%

: John says that the suspect stabbed the victim
%

: Bob says that the suspect did not kill the victim
%

: Al says that the suspect killed the victim
	

: %

and special reasons are a prima facie reason
for believing  	

as applied to Bob.
	

is an undercutter of the instance of 	

that applies to Bob.
The result in Pollock’s system is that not only the argument
based on Al’s testimony but also the argument based on
John’s testimony is justified, so that we are warranted in
believing not only that the suspect killed the victim but also
that he shot him.
So far I have put a lot of effort in avoiding floating conclu-
sions by formalising examples in a certain way. Of course,
this effort is worthwhile only if there are also also examples
where floating conclusions should be accepted, otherwise
I might just as well adopt a logic that simply invalidates
them. Example 4.1 is such an example. The defaults in
that example are just statistical regularities; the fact that
they conflict does not undermine the fairness of the sam-
ples on which they are based, so they do not undercut each
other. Another example where conflicting defaults do not
undermine each other is conflicting interpretations of a le-
gal norm. If both interpretations lead, for instance, to the
conclusion that someone has committed a tort, there seems
no reason for the judge to choose.
4.3 Concluding
Concluding, I have shown that skeptical reasoning in
multiple-extension logics with a sufficiently expressive lan-
guage can distinguish between cases where floating conclu-
sions appear to be justified and cases where they appear not
to be justified. Of course, it is debatable whether the pat-
terns identified by me are indeed relevant. Therefore, I will
next discuss how Horty’s approach fares if the pattern of
floating conclusions is rejected.
5 Zombie arguments
Let us for the sake of argument suppose that floating con-
clusions should not be accepted as justified. Is Horty’s
approach then unproblematic, or are there other reasoning
patterns where it runs into problems?
Following Makinson and Schlechta (1991) I think there is
such a pattern, viz. so-called ‘zombie arguments’. To ex-
plain this, Horty’s approach must be described in more de-
tail. Recall from Section 3 that Horty regards defeasible
reasoning as bottom-up construction of arguments inter-
leaved with argument comparison: moreover, arguments
are compared in a “deeply skeptical” way: as soon as a
counterargument is found that is at least not weaker, an ar-
gument is cut off. In case two counterarguments are equally
strong, this means that both arguments are cut off. This
explains why Horty’s approach invalidates floating conclu-
sions, since in the relevant examples construction of an ar-
gument is cut off before it reaches the floating conclusion.
Now this “deeply skeptical” approach deals in a peculiar
way with another type of example.
Example 5.1 (Zombie arguments.) Consider the argu-
ments
 
 ,
 
,  and  such that
 
 and  defeat each
other and
 
defeats  .
 

A
 
A concrete example is
 
 : Dixon is a pacifist since he is a quaker
 : Dixon is no pacifist since he is a republican
 
:
 

  Dixon has no gun since he is a pacifist
 : Dixon has a gun since he lives in Chicago
Suppose further that the first two defaults in the example
are equally strong so that
 
 and  defeat each other,
while the third default is stronger than the fourth so that
 
strictly defeats  . In Horty’s approach we must conclude
that Dixon has a gun, since the only potential counterargu-
ment,
 
, is cut off after detecting that its subargument
 

is defeated by  .
Here Horty’s deep skepticism seems self-defeating, since it
makes an argument justified that is not justified in an ap-
proach that Horty regards as a weaker form of skepticism,
viz. to consider all ways to resolve the conflict between
 

and  . Makinson and Schlechta (1991) call arguments like
 ‘zombie’ arguments:  is not ‘alive’, (i.e., not justified)
but it is not fully dead either; it has an intermediate sta-
tus (defensible), in which it can still influence the status of
other arguments.
Now is someone who does not want to accept floating
conclusions forced to accept problems with zombie paths?
This is not the case, since there are forms of skepticism
that reject floating conclusions but recognise zombie argu-
ments. For instance, in Dung’s preferred or stable seman-
tics one could define the justified conclusions to be those
of arguments that are in all extensions. Or consider Dung’s
grounded semantics, which regards as justified all argu-
ments in the least fixpoint of an operator that for any set
of arguments returns all arguments that are acceptable to it.
In the example this operator, when applied to the empty set,
returns the empty set since none of the arguments is unde-
feated. Now, interestingly, these ‘moderate’ forms of skep-
ticism validate direct reinstatement, so that it seems hard to
reject direct reinstatement without incurring problems with
Zombie arguments.
Finally, how does the alternative approach deal with Zom-
bie arguments? Recall that this approach consists of ac-
cepting both direct reinstatement and floating conclusions
while providing the means to formalise examples such that
they are not instances of these patterns. Now interestingly,
in cases where I agree with Horty that floating conclusions
should be avoided, zombie arguments might remain unde-
tected. To see this, extend the military example with two
defaults, viz. that in general the mountains are safe, but
that if the enemy is in the mountains, the mountains are not
safe. Then we have the following three arguments:
Example 5.2
 
 : The enemy has retreated to the mountains since
spy Al says so
 : The enemy has retreated to the forest since
spy Bob says so
 
:
 

  The mountains are not safe since the enemy
is in the mountains
 : By default, the mountains are safe.
If the two spy defaults are blocked as above, then the zom-
bie argument
 
is not constructible, so  comes out as jus-
tified.
Is this a problem for the alternative approach? I don’t think
so, because of the same difference in underlying pattern as
we have seen above: while Example 5.1 involves empirical
regularities, Example 5.2 involves credibility of informa-
tion sources. And in the latter case it seems reasonable
to accept that two conflicting spy reports undermine each
other if there is no reason to prefer one of them.
6 Conclusion
In this paper I have examined whether Horty’s counterex-
amples against reinstatement and floating conclusions have
provided convincing reasons to reject the validity of these
reasoning patterns. In the course of my discussion, I have
also examined the method by which Horty evaluates non-
monotonic logics, viz. assessing them in the light of intu-
itions concerning concrete examples. I now summarise the
main conclusions drawn in this paper, and then put them in
a wider perspective.
6.1 On reinstatement and floating conclusions
To start with, we can say that Horty’s discussion of rein-
statement and floating conclusions has significantly raised
our understanding of these reasoning patterns: Horty has
rightly pointed at problems with naively accepting them.
However, I have argued that his examples do not yield con-
vincing reaosns to reject these patterns. A better conclusion
from Horty’s examples is that nonmonotonic logics should
provide the expressiveness to make relevant distinctions be-
tween classes of examples. More precisely, I have argued
that nonmonotonic logics should validate at least reinstate-
ment and perhaps also floating conclusions, but provide the
means to formalise examples such that they do not instanti-
ate these patterns. This approach should be complemented
with investigating general criteria for choosing the proper
formalisation.
An additional reason for this approach is that a complete
rejection of reinstatement leads to a failure to recognise
so-called zombie arguments, which failure seems to indi-
cate that Horty’s deeply skeptical approach is in fact self-
defeating. On the other hand, we have seen that rejecting
floating conclusions does not imply a rejection of reinstate-
ment so that Horty’s arguments against the former pattern
do not reinforce his reasons for rejecting the latter pattern.
6.2 On Horty’s method of evaluating nonmonotonic
logics
As I said above, Horty claims that the only suitable way to
evaluate nonmonotonic logics is applying them to concrete
examples and checking whether they validate one’s intu-
itions concerning these examples. In Section 2 I already
hinted at some general drawbacks of this approach, and I
have illustrated these drawbacks in this paper with several
examples in which intuitions seemed to be confused with
implicit information which, when made explicit, makes the
counterintuitiveness disappear. This confusion can very
easily arise in defeasible reasoning, since a hallmark of
such reasoning is that inferences that are valid relative to
certain information can be invalidated by further informa-
tion. In my opinion it is therefore better to use intuitions not
as critical tests but as generators for further investigation.
One should always first ask whether perhaps the counterex-
ample is based on suppressed additional information. If
that is not the case, one should ask whether the counterex-
ample reflects a general pattern that can be made explicit
by enriching the language.
6.3 On the nature of principles of defeasible
reasoning
I end my conclusions with some speculative remarks on the
nature of defeasible reasoning principles, which are meant
to put the foregoing in a wider perspective. These remarks
are partly repeated from (Prakken and Vreeswijk; 2002),
in some agreement with e.g. Loui (1998) and Schlechta
(2000) and perhaps going back to Toulmin (1958). Inter-
estingly, towards the end of his (2002) paper Horty comes
very close to endorsing a similar position.
For the most part, Horty’s two papers reflect a traditional
picture of nonmonotonic logic as essentially just another
kind of logic, defining validity of inferences, so that the
question whether a certain reasoning pattern should be en-
dorsed solely depends on the meaning of the logical opera-
tors involved. This explains his attitude that one counterex-
ample suffices to reject the validity of a defeasible reason-
ing pattern. However, a different view is possible, viz. to
simply accept that defeasible reasoning is logically invalid
reasoning: after all, nonmonotonic conclusions of a theory
are not satisfied by all models of the theory. This leads to a
different, more pragmatic picture of the status of defeasible
reasoning patterns as principles of justified acceptance, i.e.,
criteria for when a statement can be accepted on the basis
of a theory given that it does not logically follow from the
theory. Put differently, since defeasible reasoning is “quick
and dirty” reasoning (Schlechta; 2000), we cannot expect
a neat and clean theory of such reasoning; the best we can
hope for is heuristics, and heuristics are not invalidated by
single counterexamples.
If this perspective is taken, room is made for other than
just syntactic and semantic criteria: what is also important
is, for instance, the nature of the domain and the knowl-
edge employed (e.g. statistical, causal, moral, legal) and
the context in which this knowledge is used (e.g. scien-
tific reasoning, quick commonsense planning, a law suit,
a medical treatment). This paper’s approach with excep-
tion clauses provides the means to express at least some
such considerations in the object level language, so that
their ‘nonlogical’ nature is respected. This perspective can
also do justice to the dynamic aspects of defeasible reason-
ing (cf. Schlechta (2000)); for instance, a judge faced with
two conflicting witnesses as in Example 4.2, would not yet
draw a conclusion but instead ask the witnesses “did you
hear any sound?”.
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